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ABSTRACT 
The Sustainable Development Goal 7 includes achieving universal electricity access, which will 
require the deployment of renewable energy sources for small-scale and decentralized electricity 
provision. However, rural electrification (RE) projects – as well as development projects more gen-
erally – often fail to maintain service delivery over time. In this paper, we approach the overarching 
question of challenges to development projects in contexts characterized by poverty, low trust and 
corruption. Previous work clearly demonstrates that development projects in general, and not least 
decentralized electrification projects, tend to face significant obstacles, and even fail, in such con-
texts. However, there is a knowledge gap regarding the mechanisms through which a “difficult” 
institutional context challenges institution building within development projects. More importantly, 
knowledge is also lacking regarding viable strategies for institution building in these contexts. In 
this paper, we study the process whereby an international non-governmental organization (NGO) 
implements a rural electrification project and establishes a small-scale hydropower station and a 
local utility to own and operate it. Through analyzing a development project with a relatively suc-
cessful institution building process, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on institution 
building in challenging contexts. We investigate first how trust in an organization can be built in a 
context characterized by low levels of generalized trust, high levels of corruption and poor institu-
tions, to the extent that people are prepared to invest in these organizations for long-term gain. 
Second, we study how free-riding problems can be handled in a local development project in a way 
that is both effective and legitimate. The analysis is based on an extensive empirical material from a 
qualitative case study, including 119 semi-structured interviews with project staff, villagers, and 
local and district government. Our study points to the importance of (a) a positive history of play 
and efforts to build trust that are sustained over a substantial period of time, (b) keeping distance 
from existing political institutions, (c) strict enforcement of the rules of the institution, and (d) strict 
impartiality in enforcement. 
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Introduction 
The Sustainable Development Goal 7: to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy for all” highlights the importance of modern energy services for development. Goal 
7 includes achieving universal electricity access, which will require the deployment of renewable 
energy sources for small-scale and decentralized (“off-grid”) electricity provision. Electricity is con-
sidered to work as a catalyst for social and economic development (Barnes 2011; Mulder and 
Tembe 2008; Peters et al. 2009). However, rural electrification (RE) projects often have less posi-
tive economic impact than anticipated (Bazilian et al. 2012; Bernard 2012; Ilskog and Kjellström 
2008; Kankam and Boon 2009; Kemausuor et al. 2011; Millinger et al. 2012; Peters et al. 2009; 
Ranganathan 1993; WB 2008). Evaluations of decentralized RE programs also indicate problems 
with technical functioning, economic viability and failures to maintain service delivery over time 
(Bångens et al. 2013; Millinger et al. 2012; Palit et al. 2013).    
Importantly, failure of planned development interventions characterizes not only electricity projects, 
but is a general trait of the post-colonial era of “aid” to sub-Saharan African countries 
(Doucouliagos and Paldam 2010; Sjöstedt 2013). For example, Ferguson (2006) argues that failure 
has been the rule rather than the exception in the African “development” sector. 
In this paper, we approach the overarching question of challenges to development projects in con-
texts characterized by poverty, low trust and corruption. Previous work clearly demonstrates that 
development projects in general, and not least decentralized electrification projects, tend to face 
significant obstacles, and even fail, in such contexts (Gullberg et al. 2005; Karekezi and Majoro 
2002; Louw et al. 2008; Madubansi and Shackleton 2006; Mulder and Tembe 2008). However, there 
is a knowledge gap regarding the mechanisms through which a “difficult” institutional context chal-
lenges institution building within development projects. More importantly, knowledge is also lack-
ing regarding viable strategies for institution building in these contexts. Despite the vast amount of 
studies in the “good governance” field, this literature does little in explaining instances of good 
governance within contexts of poor governance. While “poor governance” clearly is a very sticky 
problem, there are nevertheless examples of organizations that – against what would be expected 
from the surrounding institutional environment – manage to bring corruption under control (see 
for example Drápalová 2016). More research on such cases is needed. Moreover, existing studies 
have mainly focused on government at various levels. Very little, if any, prior work has sought to 
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understand how some non-governmental development projects succeed despite unfavorable pre-
conditions.  
In this paper, we study the process whereby an international non-governmental organization 
(NGO) implements a rural electrification project and establishes a small-scale hydropower station 
and a local utility to own and operate it. Through analyzing a development project with a relatively 
successful institution building process, this paper seeks to make a contribution to the literature on 
institution building in challenging contexts. We investigate first how trust in an organization can be 
built in a context characterized by low levels of generalized trust, high levels of corruption and poor 
institutions, to the extent that people are prepared to invest in these organizations for long-term 
gain. Second, we study how free-riding problems can be handled in a local development project in a 
way that is both effective and legitimate. We are especially interested in how the institutional con-
text, in terms of trust levels, levels of corruption etc., impact on the processes of institution build-
ing, and which strategies are adopted to meet those challenges. The case study contributes to ad-
vancing the theoretical understanding of these issues, as well as some new insights to the shared 
empirical knowledge base on institution-building in development projects (Yin 2008). 
In the next section, we discuss the context in which the development project is set and introduce 
the case. This is followed by a theoretical section, where we review some of the comparative poli-
tics literature relevant to understand the challenges that the implementing organization faced. After 
a section on methodology, we report the results from the case study. The first part of the empirical 
section engages with the research question on trust building, and the second part deals with the 
question on enforcement. The final section concludes. 
The context and the case 
The project that we study was implemented in Tanzania, which indeed provides a challenging insti-
tutional context in terms of poor institutions, corruption and low trust. In Tanzania, there is an 
uncertain legal environment for organizations to operate in. According to the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, Tanzania scores low on both Rule of law, Regulatory quality, 
and Control of corruption (World Bank 2015). The lack of control of corruption is reflected in 
perceptions about corruption. According to the East African Bribery Index 2014, 68% of the re-
spondents in Tanzania described the level of corruption in their respective country as high and felt 
it had increased in the past 12 months (Transparency International 2014). Moreover, levels of gen-
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eralized trust are relatively low in Tanzania. According to the 2005 Global Barometer Survey, 87 % 
of the respondents agreed with the statement that “You must be very careful in dealing with peo-
ple” (Global Barometer 2009). 
The Mawengi hydropower scheme 
Mawengi village is located in Ludewa District in the Southern highlands in Tanzania. Since 2010, 
Mawengi and neighboring villages in the area are supplied with electricity from a 300 kW hydro-
power station in the Kisongo river. The power station is owned and operated by the local utility 
organization LUMAMA. The process of initiating, constructing and operating the electricity system 
has been described in detail elsewhere (author citation to be added). In short, the local Catholic 
church took initiative and contacted the international development cooperation organization 
ACRA (Cooperazione Rurale in Africa e America Latina). ACRA carried out a feasibility study in 
2005, successfully applied for project funding, and started the construction process in 2006. The 
project was named the “Mawengi Integrated Rural Development Program”. ACRA worked with a 
local committee that oversaw and participated in the process. Towards the end of the construction 
phase, informal collaboration was formalized through the establishment of a local utility organiza-
tion named LUMAMA as a legal entity to own and operate the system once service delivery started. 
The hydropower plant became operational and started delivering services to the first customers in 
2010. During 2010-2014, ACRA continued infrastructural investments in the plant and electric grid 
in order to reach more communities and customers. ACRA exited the project in 2014, by which 
time LUMAMA was able to handle daily operation and customer service delivery as well as mainte-
nance and repair of infrastructure. In 2015 the utility delivered high-quality electricity services to 
around 1500 customers, with very few blackouts and at a reasonable cost. The electricity services 
were widely appreciated by the users and included public goods, such as outdoor lights and im-
provement of public services through electrification of schools and medical centers.1 Electricity 
facilitated economic development, for example by making milling significantly cheaper (compared 
to diesel generators) or less time-consuming than milling by hand. Local enterprises, such as tailor-
ing, barbers, furniture and mechanical workshops, were able to improve their services and offer 
new ones, like phone charging. 
                                                     
1 These public service providers also obtained the connection to electricity for free and had to pay only for consumption. 
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Governmental stakeholders as well as donors consider the Mawengi project as a very successful 
example of rural electrification. In the following we will investigate the challenges related to institu-
tion-building that the project met during the process, and how those challenges were met in order 
to realize the goals of the project. The next section outlines these challenges and relates them to the 
theoretical propositions in previous literature. 
Theoretical Framework 
The existing literature on institution-building is broad and concerns many different sectors, organi-
zational levels and phenomena. In order to relate more general theoretical propositions to the spe-
cific context and the type of processes we study, we will exemplify and specify the challenges faced 
by actors in our case, and how we approach these theoretically. 
The donor-funded and NGO-driven electrification project in Mawengi gave rise to two related 
problems: (1) how to become a trustworthy organization in the eyes of people in the area, and (2) 
how to make the local utility become a credible enforcer (see D’Arcy & Nistotskaya 2016) to avoid 
the project failing due to free-riding. 
First, ACRA asked for substantive contributions from people in the area - both in terms of land 
and labor - in order to get distant returns. This is common development practice in Tanzania 
(Green 2014). Land was needed for transformers, lines, and other parts of the infrastructure. Labor 
was needed to dig trenches for cables, erecting poles, etc. Moreover, private economic investments 
by future customers were required: they needed to pay for internal wiring before service delivery 
could start. Many of the contributions had to be made years before the (uncertain) benefits would 
come. Thus, in the first phase of the project the challenge for ACRA was to make people trust the 
organization to the extent that they were willing to invest for the future. 
Second, when electricity service provision started in Mawengi, new challenges arose. It became 
necessary to handle the collective action problem (CAP) of free-riding. Although there are im-
portant differences between the electricity system and what we think of as public goods – personal 
access (but not indirect access) to electricity was in principle both excludable and rivalrous as the 
system could suffer from overload – there were ways in which it was possible to free-ride on the 
system. Thus, it became necessary to make sure that the enforcement system functioned as to avoid 
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free-riding by some on the contributions of others. In phase 2, the challenge (for LUMAMA) was 
therefore to become a credible and legitimate enforcer. 
In the remainder of this section, we will review theories from the literatures on state building, cor-
ruption and clientelism which we argue are relevant to understand the challenges posed by the insti-
tutional context, and mechanisms behind the processes of successful institution building, starting 
with the issue of trust (subsection 3.1) and then questions of enforcement (subsection 3.2). 
Building trust in a low-trust environment 
As discussed above, ACRA asked for substantive contributions from people in the area, both in 
terms of land and labor, in order to get uncertain, distant returns. ACRA therefore had to make a 
credible commitment to the community, to convince individuals that investing in the project would 
actually be worth the prize.  
For individuals to be willing to invest, they must be convinced that they will, at some point, be able 
to reap the benefit of their efforts. Some level of trust in the actor that is to deliver the benefits in 
the end is therefore necessary. Trust can be defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable 
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(Mayer et al. 1995: 712). The importance of trust for reducing transaction costs is often highlighted, 
as it increases individuals’ willingness to enter collaboration and risk-taking for future gain (Murphy 
2006). 
Two commitment mechanisms are commonly discussed in the institutionalist literature. The first is 
to give a credible commitment by introducing some kind of mechanism through which the domi-
nant actor can be held accountable, which limits its ability to renege on the commitment (North 
and Weingast 1989). This strategy was not an option for ACRA. As an external NGO, it could not 
be held accountable by the people in the area by any formal means, even if failure of the project 
meant that all the efforts would be for nothing. Instead, it had to go for the second strategy dis-
cussed in the literature, namely to go for a reputational solution to the commitment problem 
(Bardhan 2005: 59). This entails building a credible commitment by signaling the organizations 
trustworthiness through repeated, positive interaction – a positive history of play (Bardhan 2005, 
see also (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
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This approach is in the literature often discussed in relation to how a government’s actions can 
promote or undermine trust. If a government has a good track record in terms of delivering on its 
promises, citizens are more likely to trust the government also in situations with limited monitoring 
possibilities (Levi 1998). In other words, when citizens “can articulate a return for their compliance 
they are likely to perceive government as reciprocating their trust” (Levi 1998: 93). The perception 
that a government is untrustworthy is instead related to its failure to keep promises.   
Importantly, we should expect that attempts to convince people to invest in an organization for 
long-term gain through strategies of building trust in the organization face specific challenges in a 
context where people are relatively poor, promises tend to be non-credible, corruption is wide-
spread, and generalized trust is low. 
First, a common claim in the clientelism literature is that poverty tends to increase risk aversion and 
shorten individuals’ time-horizons, making “uncertain and distant rewards” less appealing 
(Kitschelt 2000: 857, see also Stokes 2009; Wantchekon 2003). Widespread poverty creates a group-
level pattern of undermining long-term investments because people with small or no economic 
margins find it harder to prioritize uncertain long-term gains above immediate needs.  
Second, when it comes to the credibility of promises, we argue that in contexts where people have 
bad experiences with political actors as well as organizations, a promise from an organization is not 
worth much. As we will see below, people in this area had a lot of experiences with actors – politi-
cians as well as development actors – that made big promises but delivered very little. This is likely 
to have negative consequences for future actors to secure confidence in their operations. Keefer 
and Vlaicu (2007) discuss the problem of “credibility deficit” – i.e., that the promises made by polit-
ical candidates lack credibility – in the context of young democracies. In a low-credibility-situation, 
political actors can pursue different strategies for reducing their credibility deficit: they can either 
invest in their credibility by building reputations; or they can rely on intermediaries, i.e. making use 
of already existing channels of patronage. Building a credible commitment requires repeated inter-
action, sufficiently low discount rates for the future, and the possibility to observe actions taken. 
Since building a good reputation is costly and time-consuming, especially in a context where pov-
erty is relatively widespread (and thus the future may be heavily discounted), reliance on patrons is 
often a tempting alternative (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007). 
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While these arguments are discussed in the context of political actors in new democracies; they are 
nevertheless relevant also for development projects since NGOs initiating development projects 
often face a credibility deficit that needs to be handled somehow. In many cases, this is done – 
intentionally or not – by making use of existing channels of patronage, for example by collabora-
tion with local elites (Green 2014). The problem with such a “clientelism shortcut”, however, is that 
it may undermine efforts to build trust in the organization itself. Where actors prefer to rely on 
patrons, they do not invest in their own credibility (Keefer and Vlaicu 2007). It is, in our view, rele-
vant to ask if this mechanism applies also to development projects led by NGOs. 
Third, it has been pointed out in the literature that for a reputational solution to the problem of 
credible commitment to work, it is crucial that the actor giving a commitment never reneges on 
that promise. If the actor defects at any point, people are likely to disregard future promises from 
that actor (Bardhan 2005: 59). We believe this to be particularly relevant in contexts characterized 
by corruption and low trust. Although there is a clear relationship between institutional quality and 
trust in institutions, we suggest that we cannot expect trust levels to rise swiftly after institutions 
have improved. Low – or fragile – trust is likely to persist for long, and be an ongoing challenge 
that needs to be handled.   
Solving collective action problems: credible enforcement as a key aspect of institution 
building 
As discussed above, in the implementation phase of the project a new challenge emerged in the 
form of free-riding behavior. Free riding is commonly discussed in the context of public and semi-
public goods production as these require collective action, and brings forth the common problems 
associated with such action (Heckathorn 1989) Olson 1965). In the production of public goods 
cooperation is obviously preferred to defection. Nevertheless, this regulatory interest – shared by all 
– tend to coexist with an individual interest in defection: the temptation to free ride on the efforts 
of others, which creates a CAP of the first order (Heckathorn 1989). 
CAPs are likely to be especially severe where generalized trust is low, as in the Tanzanian context. 
Even if people are sympathetic to the goals of an organization, the suspicion that others will not 
contribute may prevent them from doing their part (Rawls 1971). In this situation, institutional 
arrangements that enforce the rules are crucial, since “in absence of the authoritative interpretation 
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and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find excuses for breaking them” (Rawls 1971: 
240). 
CAPs have gained increased attention in the political science literature, and legitimate coercion in 
order to solve free-riding problems has been called “the fundamental problem of governance” 
(Mansbridge 2014: 9). Despite its relevance for international development cooperation, it is more 
rarely discussed in that context (for an exception, see Rothstein and Tannenberg 2015). Two kinds 
of free-riding are relevant in electrification projects. One type is illegal access: that people connect 
to the system without paying, or – which is possible in systems with flat tariffs – connect to the 
system at the lowest tariff level and then, through re-wiring inside the house, make it possible to 
use more electricity than what is being paid for. 
Not paying the bills is another type of free-riding. In cases where the system lacks prepaid meters – 
quite a common situation in small-scale off-grid systems – difficulty in collecting payments (month-
ly bills paid afterwards) is a real problem. How can this be a collective action problem? After all, the 
organization has the capacity to be a credible enforcer (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2016) since it can 
monitor who pays and who does not (it has “eyes”) and it has the authority to disconnect people (it 
has “teeth”). In theory, the problem of free-riding should be solved.  
In reality, however, development projects sometimes refrain from using their enforcement power – 
turning the enforcement problem of paying into a collective action problem where people have a 
real possibility to free-ride without being punished. There are at least two reasons why development 
actors may fail to use its enforcement capacities: First, since the raison d'être for development pro-
jects is to help the poor, the actors with the capacity to enforce rules may be very hesitant to do so, 
if it means making poor people pay. Second, the social cost – especially for locally employed staff – 
may be seen as too high. The problem that enforcing agents meet strong social disapproval has 
been called the “friendship dilemma” (De la Torre-Castro 2006) and it should be highly relevant for 
locally based organizations. It could therefore be expected that development organizations have 
strong incentives to be responsive to individuals’ preferences rather than to override them. 
Responsiveness, however, is a democratic ideal that may bring new challenges. In their account of 
state capacity development, D’Arcy & Nistotskaya (2016) make the argument that if democratic 
responsiveness is introduced before an actor (the state) has established itself as a credible enforcer, 
its capacity to override welfare-undermining preferences of individuals will be reduced. This logic 
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could in many cases be applied to the governance of development projects that need cooperation 
and contributions from individuals who have incentives and possibilities to defect. Still, an im-
portant difference between enforcement in this context and how enforcement commonly is dis-
cussed in the literature on state capacity is that we study not mainly the existence of enforcement 
capacity, but rather the choice to use or not to use this capacity.2  
The paradox is that despite being particularly sensitive in a development cooperation context, en-
forcement may in fact be particularly important to sanction free-riding in such situations. If there is 
no sanction against people who do not pay their bills, willingness to pay tends to decrease quickly. 
In order for electricity services to contribute towards social and economic development – and in 
the longer time perspective a reduction in poverty – reliability and quality of service is equally im-
portant as affordability. A well working system for payment, together with tariff levels above cost-
recovery, is necessary in order to achieve economic viability of local utilities. Hence, electricity pro-
vision for free or at subsidized rates is criticized by scholars as being counterproductive, as it drains 
utilities of resources needed to maintain and extend service delivery (Ilskog and Kjellström 2008; 
Kankam and Boon 2009).  
Apart from its obvious function in limiting free-riding, we argue that credible enforcement can also 
serve an important function during institution-building in contexts characterized by corruption and 
poor leadership. Where corruption is widespread, enforcement of rules becomes arbitrary, as rules 
can be ignored upon the payment of bribes, and leaders tend to bend the rules to their favor. In 
such a situation, effective and non-arbitrary enforcement of rules sends a strong signal to the com-
munity that the enforcing organization stands apart from the surrounding institutional environ-
ment. This signal should be especially strong if it becomes clear that old leaders cannot bend the 
rules of the organization in their favor. Credible enforcement can thus help establishing an organi-
zation’s reputation as trustworthy.  
This is related to the argument made by Margaret Levi about how a government can both build and 
undermine trust depending on its actions in relation to enforcement. To show its capability to se-
cure the compliance of the otherwise non-compliant is a way to build trust, since “citizens are more 
                                                     
2 As will be shown in the case study section, a similar project as the one in Mawengi failed because of free-riding – 
some people stopped paying, and the project eventually became financially unsustainable. The individuals who stopped 
paying were not disconnected as a consequence; the project management did not use its teeth towards free-riders. As a 
result, all customers lost access in the end – everybody’s welfare was undermined. 
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likely to trust a government that ensures that others do their part” (Levi 1998: 90). If citizens in-
stead doubt that the commitment of the government to enforce laws is not credible, the ability of 
the government to generate trust will decrease. 
It could be expected that the extent to which enforcement is seen as legitimate could impact on its 
ability to serve an institution-building function. Given that “the best coercion is legitimate coer-
cion” (Mansbridge 2014: 11), how can legitimacy in enforcement be achieved? Rothstein and Te-
orell (2008) stress impartiality: more specifically, implementing institutions should be impartial 
when exercising public authority; meaning that enforcing agents “shall not take into consideration 
anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law” (2008: 
170, see also Rothstein 2009). This means that implementing actors should not only be non-
corrupt, but also refrain from giving special treatment due to friendship, kinship, and personal likes 
and dislikes when enforcing the rules. Impartiality in enforcement does not however contradict the 
possibility to transparently set rules that differentiate between groups in order to make services 
available also to the poor.  
Methods 
The Mawengi case was identified in 2011 as a promising case study. It displayed dimensions seen in 
literature as important constraints – dependence on donor funding and implemented in a poor and 
relatively remote area – as well as opportunities – a strong emphasis on local ownership, organiza-
tional capacity building and complementary investments in parallel development activities (Peters et 
al. 2009; Sovacool 2013).  
The analysis is based on empirical work conducted by the authors in 2013. A first visit took place in 
2012, followed by an in-depth qualitative case study in 2013. Together, the authors collected data 
during 3.5 months in Tanzania, with about nine weeks living in the electrified villages, and five 
weeks in the nearby town of Njombe. The following analysis is based primarily on semi-structured 
interviews – often undertaken with the help of a Tanzanian interpreter – with people involved in 
the project. We have 119 interviews about the project (27 with project staff, 81 with villagers, and 
11 interviews and meetings with local and district government).3  
                                                     
3 There are also two other sets of interviews, in total 55, which provide data on the project, but on topics of less value 
for the analysis undertaken in this paper.  
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The material also includes notes from observation, informal interaction with villagers and project 
staff, and project documentation. The second author has returned to the villages for shorter follow-
up visits on the project - including meetings and interviews – in 2014 and 2015. Thus, our analysis 
is informed by knowledge of how things have developed over time. 
The analysis is structured according to a coding scheme, which we specified prior to analysis based 
on the research questions and theoretical perspectives, and developed during the course of coding 
material. Most material has been coded using coding software, and all interviews have been checked 
for concordance and divergence (Nightingale 2009).4 The work here builds on a significant analyti-
cal work already undertaken for previous publications (see author citations to be added). 
Case Study 
This case study section is organized into two parts, starting with the question of how to build trust 
in a context characterized by low levels of generalized trust, high levels of corruption and poor 
institutions (subsection 5.1). Thereafter, we address the question of how free-riding problems can 
be handled (subsection 5.2).  
Phase 1: Building trust for long-term investment 
As mentioned, ACRA needed significant contributions in terms of voluntary labor in the construc-
tion, and economic investments by customers who needed to do internal wiring before service 
delivery could start. Initially, ACRA found it difficult to convince people that the project was actu-
ally going to happen and that it would benefit the community at large. There was a general lack of 
trust in development projects and promises made by outsiders.5 Many people said that when they 
first learned about the project they thought it was an empty promise. As one of the villagers, who 
came to be much involved in the project, explained: 
                                                     
4
 This means that we analyze and compared between interviews to identify points of disagreement and contradiction, 
examining whether respondents have similar views, concerns and explanations.
 
It is a step in the analysis that helps 
assess the credibility of inference. 
5
 As should be clear from the theoretical section, we were interested in the role of trust in making people willing to coop-
erate, take risks and invest in the future. Given this purpose, verbal statements such as the level of confidence re-
spondents have in an organization are likely to be of limited value. What we wanted to know was whether their percep-
tions of ACRA – as trustworthy or not – were consequential for their willingness to engage with the project. We therefore 
did not ask the respondents explicitly about trust levels. Instead, the interviews were as much as possible based on 
open questions, asking the respondents to describe what it was like when ACRA came, how they perceived the prepa-
rations and the implementation process, in what role they participated themselves, etc. This was combined with more 
detailed follow-up questions. 
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Local staff member: For the first time when they introduced this project, I thought that it will not 
be possible (…) because we are in a very remote area, so I thought that it was just politics. But later, 
when they started construction, I started to believe that it is going to happen because I saw some 
materials coming like the poles and wires. (…) Finally I believed [it was true] after seeing the light 
turned on.  
Interviewer: What do you mean by politics?  
Local staff member: The issue of bringing electricity in our area was first mentioned by politicians 
(…) during their campaign. So when this issue came again people thought it was the same issue, 
which was mentioned every time by politicians without any implementation. 
This relates to what was discussed in the theoretical section about challenges organizations face 
when promises tend to be non-credible. It became clear that this was a context where broken 
promises by outsiders are the norm rather than the exception, and that this had a profound impact 
on how people interpret promises.  
Many of the interviewees mentioned broken promises by politicians, government officials and 
NGOs as a reason for not believing in ACRA from the start. 
Customer: At the time I did not believe it, because we were often being promised things but we 
did not get them. 
Interviewer: Who promised these things that did not happen? 
Customer: The government, for example, was promising us many things. For example, they prom-
ised to put tarmac on the road but they have not yet done it. 
Apart from the lack of trust in politicians, there was a clear credibility deficit also for NGOs: 
Customer: At the beginning, I thought it was just a lie. Because a lot of Europeans [other than 
ACRA] were coming and did a survey of the [water] intake and said that it was ok [but did not do 
anything].  
Interviewer: When did you start to believe it would come true? 
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Customer: When they came and started to work. Because before other people came and just sur-
veyed and then left. 
Interviewer: Do you remember what it was like when ACRA first came, and said they wanted to 
bring electricity here? What did you think then?  
Customer: I did not believe it was true. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
Customer: Because many organizations [from outside of Tanzania] were coming and said they 
would bring electricity, but they never came back again. 
This credibility deficit for foreign NGOs is something that ACRA was well aware about. 
ACRA staff: [T]here are so many associations led by European persons, and maybe they failed or 
maybe they just promise something and it never happens; and here in Tanzania, the associations 
from Europe or from … let’s call it first world countries; they were hundreds! In the beginning they 
said: “This is one of the hundreds (…) we can’t believe this.” 
Facing this credibility deficit, ACRA chose to invest in its own credibility. One of the first things 
ACRA did was to hold public meetings in the three larger villages that were to be connected and to 
establish a small working committee of elected men and women from each village. This committee 
was involved in the work throughout the entire construction.  
What eventually led people to believe in the project – and be willing to invest their time and labor 
in the construction, as well as their own money in buying materials and doing internal wiring of the 
house in order to be connected – was the way ACRA slowly built trust by being very careful to not 
make any promises that they could not hold. Instead, they promised small things that they were 
absolutely certain that they could deliver – seedlings, paint, cement, etc. The importance of keeping 
every little promise that was made was highlighted by several people in the organization. As one 
staff member put it: “You have to say what you do and do what you say”. The rule was to never 
promise anything that they were not 100 percent sure to deliver – 99 percent were not enough to 
make a promise.  
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The strategy of limited – and fulfilled – promises reoccurs in the interviews as one of the reasons 
people began to trust ACRA. 
Customer: When they [ACRA] promise something, they do it. There is no instance when they 
have made a mistake. 
Customer: The community has a primary school not far from here. So ACRA said that “if you 
build we will bring iron roof, paint, nails”. And they did. So when they promise something, they do 
it. 
Moreover, ACRA added detail to the very limited promises they made. For example, not only did 
they say that they would bring certain goods, or hold a meeting; they also said exactly when they 
would bring the goods or hold the meeting. Again, this is noticed by people in the area and be-
comes, to them, a reason to trust ACRA. 
Customer: If they [ACRA] promise anything, they fulfill. 
Interviewer: How do you know? What makes you sure? 
Customer: They promised that tomorrow we bring poles, and then they brought them the next 
day.  
The visibility of the things that ACRA brought to the community is important. What really made an 
impression on many people was that they saw trucks coming with materials that were stocked at the 
office in Mawengi, and with the construction of the grid, poles and electric lines were erected and 
reaching into the villages and people’s homes. Many respondents give examples of starting to be-
lieve in the project because of specific activities, such as “when they started digging the trenches”. 
Notably, people perceived a difference between ACRA and LUMAMA in how well they kept their 
promises. 
Customer: At a very high percentage, everything ACRA is promising, they are also doing. 
Interviewer: What if LUMAMA gives a promise? 
Customer: I can’t say, because there are a lot of promises, but some of them they fulfil and some 
of them they don’t fulfill. 
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When we asked follow up questions, it became clear that LUMAMA had in fact delivered on the 
promise, only a bit later than promised. The dramatic consequences of such limited failures can be 
better understood if we take into account the specific challenges of the context.  
As suggested in the theoretical section, where people have a lot of experience with corruption and 
broken promises from leaders, trust in a new organization can be expected to build slowly and stay 
fragile over a long period of time. People’s perceptions and expectations about institutions could 
thus hold back trust in an institution, even if it is largely credible. This proposition is supported by 
our data: as our interviews show, even small deviations from a positive track record can have con-
sequences far beyond what we would expect in contexts with generally better institutions. The fail-
ure to deliver exactly as promised is interpreted against a background of broken promises and has 
consequences for trust in the organization. 
In sum, ACRA built a positive reputation over an extended period of time. There are two im-
portant lessons from this experience. The first is that it is, in fact, possible to make a credible com-
mitment based on reputational credibility also in a context as difficult as the one in this case – but it 
takes time. The second, however, is that when pursuing such a strategy, there is no room for mis-
takes. Any deviation from a positive track record may instantly undermine the hard-won trust. 
Given the efforts that are needed in order to strengthen the organization’s own credibility, it is easy 
to understand why some actors – not least within international development projects – wish to find 
“credibility short-cuts”. As discussed in the theoretical section, a common strategy is to rely on 
existing patron-client relationships. In many instances, it is necessary to establish collaborations 
with the political elite in order to formally “enter” the community and gain permission to carry out 
projects. The local church acted as host for ACRA, helping to establish relationships with all local 
political leaders who gave their support for the project. Over time, the NGO distanced itself from 
local political institutions and in many instances chose not to rely on local leaders. For example, 
ACRA soon decided to directly employ and pay people to work on construction rather than to rely 
on local politicians for mobilizing the villagers to do voluntary work.  
ACRA also used institutional strategies in order to delimit the influence by politicians on the pro-
ject. First of all, politicians are not allowed to have any positions of leadership in LUMAMA. This 
choice is motivated in this interview with one of ACRAs (Tanzanian) staff members: 
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Local staff: Politicians - they should not be candidates for election [to the board of LUMAMA]. 
[…] It’s something which we should be very careful with because these people they do things to 
make sure that their party is getting support. Let’s say, you have the elections and somebody is a 
leader; a mwenyekiti, I mean, the chairman of the board, and you are doing a party election. What do 
you think, if they don’t have enough funds? They could take funds from LUMAMA and begin to 
use it to do the elections.  
Second, the organizational structure has three levels of decision-making and these do not corre-
spond to existing geographical borders of local government. The lowest organizational level in the 
membership based utility is the level of transformer (each transformer supplies electricity to a spe-
cific area). The transformer groups select their representatives for the higher level of zone, at which 
the members in turn elect representative for the General Assembly. The transformer groups’ geo-
graphical borders do not align with the local administrative borders. This makes it hard for individ-
ual local leaders to say that the transformer is under his/her area of influence, and to use it for own 
purposes. 
5.2 Phase 2: Institution building through credible enforcement 
In the second phase of the project, when the power plant had started functioning, new challenges 
appeared, this time related to enforcement. This section illustrates the dilemmas involved in making 
enforcement both credible and legitimate and at the same time being responsive to poor peoples’ 
situation. 
The first years, the majority of households and public institutions paid flat tariffs, based on the 
number of power points in the premises. Public institutions, households with higher consumption, 
many businesses and all milling machine owners had meters and paid a unit cost per kWh, differen-
tiated according to activity.6 
In the area of Mawengi, people had no previous experience of paying monthly bills or reading cus-
tomer contracts. In 2013, the accountant explained that LUMAMA was facing a challenge because 
many customers did not pay their bills on time, which led to a budget deficit for the utility. In the 
interviews, various reasons why people did not pay their bills on time were identified: lack of expe-
                                                     
6 During 2014, the system with flat tariffs has been replaced by a pre-paid system with meters for all customers. 
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rience, distance to the office and lack of money due to seasonal cash flow – but also that customers 
were not expecting enforcement, and that some held attitudes that one can free ride. A collective 
action problem was clearly present – the individual incentive to delay payment was working against 
the common interest in a financially sustainable electricity utility. 
Facing this challenge, the decision was taken that customers who did not pay on time would be 
disconnected after only one month, rather than after two or three months, which was the initial 
rule. In order to be reconnected again the customer also had to pay a fine of 25 000 TZS, which is a 
substantial amount in this context. 
At first, people did not expect LUMAMA to enforce the new rule. This was not an unreasonable 
expectation.  As discussed above, development projects sometimes refrain from using their en-
forcement power – since they have strong incentives to be responsive to individuals’ preferences 
rather than to override them – which gives people a real possibility to free-ride without being pun-
ished. LUMAMA, however, chose a different route. The first month the new regulation was in 
force, LUMAMA disconnected all households that had not paid the bill on time. This was clearly 
against the preferences of the customers, and something that was criticized by many in the inter-
views: while most say that it is legitimate to disconnect those who do not pay their bills, very few 
felt it justified to do so after only one month of delay. They argued that LUMAMA should show 
consideration for how poor people are. However, despite the negative reactions to this enforce-
ment, it had the intended effect: after the customers had realized that the rules were being strictly 
enforced, the number of delayed payments was drastically reduced, and in the coming months, 
much fewer households had to be disconnected. 
As discussed in the theoretical section, one reason why locally based development actors fail to use 
its enforcement capacities has been called the friendship dilemma, meaning that the social cost of 
enforcement – especially for locally employed staff – may be seen as too high. The friendship di-
lemma was clearly present also in Mawengi. For example, one of the employed local technicians 
explained how he felt very bad when they went to disconnect customers who were late with pay-
ments.  
Interviewer: When you go disconnecting people, how do they react?   
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Technician: “I don't like it (he shakes his head). I feel bad about it. Even for the customer it is the 
same.  
Not all staff felt that using the sanction of disconnection was problematic. The manager and ac-
countant saw it as a necessary and positive action. They were also strongly supported by ACRA 
staff to enforce the customer regulation, and they saw it as being their responsibility in exercising 
good governance the way they had been trained. In the encounter with customers about to be dis-
connected, the manager refers to the contract which stipulates the rules:  
Interviewer: Did you meet any of the people who you disconnected? 
Manager: Yes  
Interviewer: And how did they react?  
Manager: Because we already announced so they knew that today we are going to disconnect, so 
while we were disconnecting few of them came to apologize and they paid so we didn’t disconnect 
them and the rest came to pay for their bills and fines today.  
Interviewer: Was anyone upset? 
Manager: Yes, there are two people who were upset but they came to pay for their bills and we 
gave them clarifications and because what we did is stated in our contract then they understood.  
To illustrate the mechanisms through which free-riding problems, if not dealt with, over time can 
threaten the survival of projects, we will briefly consider a contrasting case of rural electrification 
studied by the second author (author citation to be added). A Tanzanian NGO, TaTEDO, imple-
mented a small “Energy Service Platform” providing multiple services to the village Leguruki in 
Arusha region in 2008. The system included a diesel-powered engine, a milling machine, an oil 
press, an alternator and a micro-grid that supplied 49 customers with electricity in the evenings. The 
NGO owned the system but it was managed by a local village energy team and operated by a local 
technician employed in the project. The milling machine and oil press were operated as a commer-
cial service for all villagers. For grid customers, individual monthly tariffs were based on planned 
consumption and individual ability to pay. The decision was taken jointly by the energy team and 
grid customers in a meeting. The procedure was thus democratic and implemented a partial princi-
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ple for setting of tariffs. The incomes from milling, the oil press and grid customers were used to 
buy new fuel to the diesel engine powering the machinery and grid. 
However, the collection of monthly tariffs became a problem after a few months. Some grid cus-
tomers delayed payments or refused to pay, either because they were not happy with the service 
provided, because they felt their tariff was too high – or because they had heard rumors that the 
NGO would pay for fuel, and they therefore expected that they would not have to pay. The people 
on the energy team who were responsible for collecting payments found it socially challenging to 
convince their neighbors and relatives to pay, i.e. they experienced the friendship dilemma. They 
could have used the sanction of disconnection but chose not to. Instead, the lack of income made it 
difficult to buy new fuel and the committee had to reduce the hours of service delivery. There were 
also recurrent technical problems incurring temporary stops in service. The reduced quality of ser-
vice and the free-riding quickly eroded the willingness to pay also among the other customers. 
Technical and institutional weaknesses combined to aggravate the economic situation. As the NGO 
did not have funding to do necessary repair and extend the system to more customers, local actors 
took the decision to stop the grid service after about a year and half, and all customers lost access 
to electricity. This brief example, when contrasted to the Mawengi case, shows that the choices 
regarding enforcement that are made within development projects can have profound consequenc-
es for project success or failure. 
Enforcement is also related to questions of legitimacy and social status. “Treat all customers alike” 
was a guiding principle for LUMAMA, and one of its implications is that local leaders have to fol-
low the same rules as everybody else. On more than one occasion, LUMAMA disconnected local 
people with high social status. This clearly involved high social costs for the staff:  
Manager: In our project we don’t look at people’s positions, we treat all customers equally, that is 
why we disconnected the [specifies a local politician] because he is not paying the tariff. (…) So we 
just follow what is in the constitution and our rules, I can even be disconnected, even the parish 
priest [the local church partner] could be disconnected.  
Interviewer: For how long was [the politician] disconnected? 
Manager: For almost six month know. I even reported him to [higher level of government], he 
was called by the disciplinary committee and he was instructed in writing to pay the tariff. 
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Interviewer: Why is he not paying? 
Manager: It is just politics. That is why for me, I see that it is better for the people to hate me, just 
to make sure that the project continues through enforcement of law.  
This quote illustrates the high stakes involved in enforcing rules against the local elite, but also, that 
the local utility managed to gain the support of higher levels of government in doing so. 
Recalling the theoretical discussion, impartiality in implementation could have a legitimizing func-
tion (Rothstein & Teorell 2008). The fact that sanctions were used also against local leaders won 
the support of ordinary villagers – it had a legitimizing effect. In such instance, it served an im-
portant function of making LUMAMA a credible and non-corrupt organization in the eyes of vil-
lagers. From the interviews, it is clear that the fact that also powerful people are being disconnected 
is considered a very good thing by many: 
Customer: If you delay the payment, all people are disconnected. It does not matter who you are. 
Interviewer: Do you think that this is a good thing or a bad thing? 
Customer: It is a good thing. It is not choosing people 
Customer: It is the same for all people. 
Interviewer: Even a very powerful person? 
Customer: [laughs] Yes, they disconnect for all. 
Interviewer: What do you think about that? 
Customer: They are putting all the people in equal position. No rich and no poor. […] This is 
perfect because all people are equal. 
Through the act of disconnecting people who normally are “above the law”, LUMAMA has estab-
lished its authority and the importance of rules.7 This may be part of the reason why generally, vil-
lagers in our study consider LUMAMA to be non-corrupt and doing a good job. 
                                                     
7 One interview was made with a government official at the Ward Executive Office (WEO), which is the administrative 
level above village and below district. Towards the end of the interview, we learned that the office had been disconnect-
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Many perceived the use of disconnection, also of ordinary people, to be a fair sanction when bills 
were not paid. In many instances, the fact that enforcement was “following the rules” makes it 
predictable and thus acceptable.8 
Interviewer: Have you been disconnected? 
Customer: Yes. 
Interviewer: What did you think about that? 
Customer: It was just OK, they disconnected me because I was not around; I was travelling. I 
came home and found that they had disconnected. It was according to the contract so it was just 
OK. (…) All the people know that if you can’t pay your bill, they disconnect. 
Interviewer: Have you been disconnected? 
Customer: Yes. 
Interviewer: What did you think about that? 
Customer: It was ok because I already got the information that they were coming to disconnect. 
In sum, the procedural fairness in enforcement – manifested not least in a strong impartiality norm 
– had a legitimizing effect. One indicator that enforcement over time became regarded as legitimate 
is that when it comes to illegal access people contributed to the enforcement by reporting on peo-
ple who did re-wiring inside their homes. 
However, while disconnecting local leaders is seen as legitimate, and reflects positively on LUMA-
MA, disconnecting a poor family is not considered equally legitimate. This indicates that effective 
regulation based on a ‘treat all customers alike’ principle is not necessarily perceived as fair.  
                                                                                                                                                           
ed because they were late with paying. When asked what he thought about the office having been disconnected, the 
government official laughed and replied: “It is fair. Because we broke the rules.” 
8
 During one period, a type of enforcement was being used which was clearly illegitimate in the eyes of the customers: a 
list of all customers who had not paid the bill was made public, for example it was read out loud in church after mass. It 
was not intended as a punishment – it was seen by LUMAMA as an efficient way of reminding people – but people 
thought it was very embarrassing to be on the list. The list met with so strong reactions that LUMAMA stopped using this 
method.  
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Customer: My opinion is that LUMAMA should put the customers in two categories: those who 
can afford to pay and old people that are taking care of orphan children. They should consider 
them more. 
It is also with the purpose of being fair that the management of LUMAMA makes its only devia-
tion from the impartiality norm: in situations where customers failed to pay the bills because they 
had some kind of crisis in the family – sickness or temporary economic difficulties – the staff 
sometimes lowered the level of the fine that had to be paid for reconnecting. For example, in a 
group discussion with the staff we learned that a woman who cried and was very polite when com-
ing to pay the fine had paid only 10 000 TZS instead of the stipulated 25 000 TZS. The staff felt 
they had to consider the family situation and told of multiple occasions when they, in this way, 
compromised and deviated from the principle “treat all customers alike”.  
Manager: We are dealing with the community and people in this community have low income and 
not the same, they have different incomes. So now some pay less and some pay a lot. The person 
comes and you see this person has no means to pay the full fine, then you charge less. 
Interviewer: Why not have a lower fine for everybody? 
Manager: That is not good because we need to make them pay on time [so the fine must be 
heavy]. 
Interviewer: What do you think the customers think of this, that they pay different amounts? 
Manager: They do not know, it is a secret of the office. Also, perhaps someone has a funeral and 
was supposed to pay that day. Then you don’t go and disconnect, you just leave it. This is also a 
secret of the office. 
However, this information did not remain a secret of the office. Some customers were aware that 
the enforcement of fines was not strict, and drew the conclusion that a bribe had been paid:  
Customer: The fine is ok but the leaders are using segregation. Because some people they can pay 
20 000 and some they can pay 10 000. But all of them are disconnected. 
Interviewer: Why do you think they do it differently? 
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Customer: These leaders in the office, they know; and maybe they are getting something from 
these people that are paying less. It must be that they are getting something. But I am not sure. 
Interviewer: How do you know that people pay different fines? 
Customer: People talk to the community. […] So maybe those who pay 10 000 tell their fellow 
customers they only paid 10 000. So they make other customers jealous, to not feel good. 
Again, this illustrates how in contexts characterized by corruption and low trust, small deviations 
from an otherwise good track record can have large consequences for an organization’s credibility. 
It is not surprising that special treatment – even when it is done in order to be fair – is interpreted 
as corruption, when this is how special treatment tends to be achieved. 
To some extent, the staff was aware of rumors of corruption but felt the trust in LUMAMA was 
growing. The problem was attributed to low levels of trust in the community, rather than the devia-
tion from rules. 
Manager: This is something that is happening also with the technicians of LUMAMA. People are 
saying they are getting bribes but you find they are not. You find maybe someone has a very large 
house, and then you take more than one technician there to do the work quickly. And then they 
think that people may have given them bribes to do that. 
Interviewer: Do you think rumors like this could undermine trust in LUMAMA? 
Manager: These rumors are not affecting us; we just continue to do our work. Instead of listening 
to the rumors we just continue to do our work. 
Interviewer: Do you think there are more rumors now than before, or less? 
Manager: At the beginning there were more rumors, but now it is less. 
Interviewer: Why do you think there is less now? 
Manager: Because the result is good. 
Survey data has showed that many Tanzanian respondents do not report instances of corruption 
because they feel that no action would be taken to resolve their complaint (Transparency Interna-
  26 
tional 2014). This problem is illustrated in these quotes about a typical kind of corruption incident 
in the area: 
Customer: Maybe two persons are having a quarrel. Then you go to the local government. Then, 
you think that you have a case, but they tell you the argument is over. 
Local staff: But if let’s say somebody does something and takes to the village authority […] some-
body gives the village chairman, or whoever, some kind of bribe, then it ends up like that. Some-
body is not getting what is right. […] In that situation [as the one above] who can they call? With 
the leaders, let’s say government leaders; there is not much they can do. 
Within LUMAMA, a complaint mechanism has been introduced. A telephone number is posted 
everywhere, and on flyers brought to the meetings it says “in case you have a problem or you want 
to communicate, this is the number you should use for communication”. It is also ensured that 
action is taken every time there is a complaint. 
ACRA staff: Everybody is to report or refer about cases of customers that are complaining […]. It 
is their [LUMAMA management and the LUMAMA board] duty to try to investigate immediately 
and not wait until these rumors become something big. So that is also why there was this reaction 
from LUMAMA to the [local leader who spread rumors about LUMAMA]. Maybe it [rumors] is 
something that will never end. What is important is to stop it, or to investigate, or to show to the 
people that you are present – you, the Board of LUMAMA – that you are consistent and you inves-
tigate it immediately. 
The challenges associated with building up a new local organization and establishing it as trustwor-
thy, non-corrupt and credible as an enforcer are significant, context-specific and dynamic. As we 
hope that these examples show, there is a constant interplay between wider institutional and con-
textual factors and the people involved in the project. The process in Mawengi is unique, but we 
think it contributes some insights of more general theoretical importance. 
Conclusions  
Through analyzing a development project with a relatively successful institution building process 
this paper has aimed at making a contribution to the literature on institution building in challenging 
contexts. The study shows that it is indeed possible to build a credible commitment through a posi-
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tive track record also in a context characterized by low levels of generalized trust and high levels of 
corruption. However, one needs to be aware of how the context impacts on this process. Keefer 
and Vlaicu (2007) discuss how building a reputational credibility in a low credibility context takes 
time and is costly. To that, from the experiences in this study, we could add that you cannot afford 
to make any mistakes. Unlike a more stable institutional context where trust is reasonably high, in 
this context any mistake could erase trust. In that sense, this study indicates that the link between 
high quality institutions and trust might be less straightforward than sometimes is acknowledged. 
Whereas we should expect that trust is likely to diminish in a context of poor institutions, we 
should be aware that the building of good institutions is unlikely to give an immediate payoff in the 
form of high and stable trust levels. Rather, we should expect that good institutions and low levels 
of trust could co-exist for quite some time, which has to be taken into account by all actors trying 
to build institutions in difficult contexts. Moreover, as trust does rise, it is likely to stay fragile over 
an extended period of time. 
Consequently, it is essential to set the expectations right. The people from ACRA whom we inter-
viewed underlined the importance of never increasing expectation beyond what is realistic; and thus 
never promising anything that you are not completely sure to be able to deliver. Importantly, 
ACRA also had a long-term perspective and could devote time to increasing trust during a substan-
tial period before the plant started operating. This is not always (or usually) the case in development 
projects, where arrangements can be insecure or temporary. Part of the successful strategy was also 
to create distance from existing institutions by keeping local leaders at arm’s length instead of tak-
ing a “clientelist shortcut” which again is something that development projects sometimes do. 
This study also shows that impartial enforcement can serve an important function in the institution 
building process. An emerging free-riding problem was solved through strict enforcement of a new 
rule regarding disconnections. The enforcement came as a surprise to many people, indicating that 
it was only with the new rule that LUMAMA established itself as a credible enforcer. Moreover, by 
enforcing the rule also on powerful persons, LUMAMA was able to show that it had “teeth”, and it 
appears to have contributed to a widely shared view of LUMAMA as both strong and legitimate 
(although contested by some people).  
This study also contributes to our understanding of legitimacy in terms of being seen as non-corrupt. 
Institution builders in contexts with high levels of corruption and low trust are facing two hercule-
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an tasks with regard to corruption: First, there is of course the challenge to build an organization 
with a management that upholds high standards in terms of good governance. The other challenge 
is to actually convince people that the organization is non-corrupt. Even in the absence of corrup-
tion, rumors about corruption might flourish which may be enough to undermine confidence in the 
institution. As we saw, very small deviations from the impartiality norm in enforcement led to ru-
mors of corruption.  
In the theory section, impartiality as a legitimacy-enhancing mechanism was discussed, meaning 
that not only should implementing actors be non-corrupt, but also refrain from giving special 
treatment due to friendship, kinship, and personal likes and dislikes when enforcing the rules 
(Rothstein & Teorell 2008). In this case, the management sometimes accepted a lower payment 
from people who were poor, upset, and genuinely worried about the fine. According to the inter-
views, this way of handling the issue by the management fit well with popular demand – although 
tough enforcement was accepted in principle (and easily accepted when applied to powerful people) 
many respondents argued for a softer approach towards poor families. 
However, D´Arcy and Nistotskaya (2016) suggest that if a ruler caves in to popular demand, that 
actor’s credibility as an enforcer will be undermined. Although their argument is about state capaci-
ty and government, a similar mechanism could be observed in this case: when rules were not strictly 
enforced towards the non-privileged, rumors of corruption started to flourish. In other words: in 
order to increase legitimacy by abiding by a norm of fairness, LUMAMA deviated from the impar-
tiality norm, with the consequence that the organization’s legitimacy was weakened in another re-
spect – some people now thought that the management was corrupt. One way to handle this di-
lemma could be to add more “partiality” when formulating the rule, but to implement it impartially. 
For example, one could differentiate the fines based on a principle of rich and poor having unequal 
ability to pay. It would still be challenging to agree on clear criteria for such a principle, but partiali-
ty of the rule is likely more legitimate than partiality in enforcement of the rule.  
Finally, one lesson learned from this study is that building trust and enforcing rules in challenging 
contexts takes time and comes with substantial costs while the benefits of doing so are long-term, 
and this needs to be taken into account by development actors. 
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